Submission Deadline: Before November 25, 2016
Registration Deadline: Before December 10, 2016
Final Paper Submission: Before December 10, 2016
Conference Date: January 3-5, 2017


Conference Secretary: Claire Lee

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+86-28-86512185 (China)


• Full Paper (Publication & Presentation)

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• Abstract (Oral Presentation only, without publication)

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Invited Speakers

Keynote Speaker

Prof. Ubaldo Comite
University of Calabria, Arcavacata, Rende, Italy

Prof. Ubaldo Comite was born in Cosenza, Italy, June 14 1971. He has a degree in Law (1994) and Economics (1996) at the University of Messina (Italy), and earned his Ph.D. in Public Administration at the University of Calabria, Rende (Cs) Italy, in 2005. Currently he is a professor of Budget and Business Organization at the Faculty of Economy, Department of Business Sciences, University of Calabria. Furthermore he is a professor of Business Administration at the Faculty of Economy, University Giustino Fortunato (Benevento, Italy). His Research interests are: Private and Public Management, Non profit Organizations and Accounting.

Speech Title: Equity Crowdfunding: Strategies, Dynamics and New Opportunities in the Innovation Financing Markets

Abstract: The phenomenon of the equity crowdfunding is seen as a revolutionary form of financing from the bottom. In light of the current economic scenario and the persistence of the credit crunch situation, the equity crowdfunding is considered by many as a possible solution to the difficulties encountered by small and medium enterprises in obtaining the financial resources required for growth.
Firstly, the aim of this work is introducing the equity crowdfunding contextualizing the phenomenon in the academic debate and analyzing its global development. After presenting the crowdfunding phenomenon in general, specific peculiarities of the equity crowdfunding are defined and, at the same time, an analysis of the state regulations at international level is carried out. Straightforward will be presented a survey of worldwide active platforms.
An additional purpose of this work is to propose a theoretical model able to explain the phenomena that influence entrepreneurs and investors’ decisions in the use of this financing tool. The described model shows that the informational asymmetries between entrepreneur (creator) and potential investors (crowdfunders) can be exploited by those who publish the capital offer in order to "trick" the market.
In view of the model’s results is demonstrated how all this can lead to market failure if actors do not act in a way that limit existing information asymmetries.

Plenary Speaker

Prof. Suresh Deman
Honorary Director & UNEP/UNCTAD Consultant, Centre for Economics & Finance, UK

Prof. Suresh Deman has an undergraduate degree in mathematics, two Masters degrees & ABD (from India & US) and was an M. Phil (UK) in Finance and Economics and a PhD (Japan). His major fields of interests are as follows: Real Estate Finance, Game theory, Microeconomics, Macroeconomics, Development Economics, Regional Urban Economics and Econometrics. He also has interest in the application of quantitative economics, econometrics and game theory to Economics, Finance and Accounting.

Speech Title: Game of Land Acquisition

Abstract: In the Land economics literature, broadly two classes of models, Bayesian and non-Bayesian are often used. Crash in housing prices in US and Western Europe made the study of this subject even more important. As opposed to auctioning and sequential bidding models which give suboptimal outcome, I proposed a subgame perfect approach to the problem of the Agents acquiring land for Industrial Development. The problem outlined in this paper is a combination of the problems addressed by Grossman and Hart (1980) and by Shleifer and Vishny (1986) in the corporate control literature.

The basic distinction between Grossman & Hart above paper and the others is the assumption of a continuum of players and atomistic agents. Why should this matter? I will elaborate this briefly. With a continuum of players’ assumption, the paradox is caused by the "disappearance of information" because only the aggregate play is observed. Hence, the individual deviation cannot be met by rewards and punishments. In a finite number of players game, there is a change in the aggregate play whenever a player deviates. The change may be very small, but perfectly observable. Therefore deviations can be rewarded or punished regardless of number of players. Hence, the results are straight forward that the acquisition will occur with positive probability in models with finitely many players.

The main conclusion of the paper is that the threat of takeover can facilitate redevelopment programme undertaken by a developer even though the equilibria are straightforward in a finitely many players' game for the reasons stated above. I also show that the developer faces a trade-off between a low bid price and a high probability of takeover. Paper makes a useful application of game theory and corporate finance to address policy issues of dilution, imminent domain, slum equilibria, and other problems. In fact, it seems like a potentially interesting idea and it might even be possible for a local government to adopt such a rule.

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